COMMUNIA FINAL REPORT | Recommendation # 1

Subtitle: 
Copyright Protection for performers and sound recordings

The proposed term extension of copyright protection for performers and sound recordings will harm the public domain and must not be implemented.

(Corresponding to COMMUNIA Policy Recommendation 2 - Download Postcard)

The Commission and Member States should carefully review expert opinions on this topic, as detailed at the end of this recommendation. Term extension will not create additional incentives to create but will make access to large parts of our audiovisual heritage more difficult than it already is. Instead of pursuing this special interest driven legislation the divergence in the length of protection between allotted to performers and authors should be taken as an opportunity to reevaluate the effectiveness of the current term of protection. Such a reevaluation must take into account the COMMUNIA policy recommendations #1 and #8.

Background

In July 2008, the European Commission adopted a proposal (COM(2008) 464/3) intended to extend the term of protection for performers and sound recordings. Currently these rights are protected for 50 years starting from the recording (or “fixation”) or from the performance, as the case may be. According to the proposal, the term would have been extended to 95 years. According to the Commission, the aim of the proposal was to bring performers' protection more in line with that currently available to authors (expiring 70 years after their death). More generally, the extended term was deemed necessary to enable performers to earn a decent income during their lifetime.

In April 2009 the proposal was voted in Parliament, which essentially approved it, with the following main planks: (1) the extension of the term of protection from 50 to 70 years (instead of the proposed 95); (2) the creation of a fund for the benefit of session players amounting to 20% of record labels' offline and online sales revenue coming from the term extension; (3) a “use it or lose it” clause allowing performers to get back control of their rights after 50 years, in cases in which producers are not marketing their recording; and (4) a newly introduced “clean slate” provision, preventing the use of previous contractual agreements to deduct money from the additional royalties granted to performers from the term extension.

Overall, the Parliament reduced the quantitative significance of the term extension (from 45 to 20 years) and slightly reinforced the provisions aimed at ensuring the benefits from the extension could accrue in a significant way to performers. However, these amendments did not substantially address the reasons because of which all the independent studies which examined the term extension proposal came to the conclusion that the proposed measures fail to reach each and all of their intended goals (see below).

That is the case because of several orders of reasons:

(1) The proposal fails to provide for additional income effectively accruing to the pockets of performers, since performers lack bargaining power vis-à-vis their more powerful counterparts, the labels (to which they frequently assign all their rights through so called buy-out agreements). Instead of addressing this issue, Art. 10a of the draft directive still provides that agreements between performers and phonogram producers entered into before the date of the term extension would remain in force, “in the absence of clear contractual  indications to the contrary”.

This conclusion is not affected by the provision whereby a minimum of 20% of the additional proceeds received by phonogram producers would be allocated to a collecting-society managed social fund. This benefit would accrue only to session musicians and, moreover, its calculation method is at best uncertain. The relevant proceeds are the ones generated through the reproduction, distribution and making available of the performances, with the exclusion of the important income deriving as a result of communication to the public (e.g. by radio broadcasting).

(2) The proposal does not even supply any effective incentive to phonogram producers and to labels. This is so for the very fundamental reason that the proposal also applies to existing works and no provision adopted today may provide any incentive towards investments which were already decided and made in the past. Even if we look at the future only, the need for an additional prospective incentive is hardly proved. Indeed, the common intuition whereby digital technology has decreased rather than increased the costs necessary to set up a performance and to fixate it has been confirmed by available empirical evidence [Helberger et al 2008].

(3) The Commission explicitly relates the need for a term extension to the fact that the music industry is suffering from illegal peer-to-peer file sharing and need to be compensated. However, it is hard to see how the extension of the term may in any way deter illegal distribution of music.

(4) The case made by the proposal whereby European label companies should be put on an equal footing with their US counterparts, which recently were granted an extension of terms similar to the one proposed for the EU, is technically flawed and misguided. Indeed, in the field of IP, including in connection with the neighbouring rights here considered, which in the US are described as copyright in sound recordings, the principle of National Treatment applies. Now, as a result of this principle, European labels currently are not in any way disadvantaged in comparison to their US counterparts. EU labels are treated in the US in the same way as their American competitors, which, in turn, are treated as European labels in the EU. Quite apart from this, all the “majors” are US labels; therefore any term extension would disproportionately benefit US firms to the detriment of EU consumers.

(5) In specific connection with the issue of the assessment of the costs the legislative measure would involve, the argument advanced by the Commission whereby the term extension would not entail additional costs, as a survey has shown that the price of in copyright music does not exceed the cost of music out of copyright, is disingenuous and self-contradictory. In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission mentions that the term extension would generate additional income for phonogram producers in the range of over Euro 750 million. Now, it would appear that it is impossible that additional income accrues to one group of beneficiaries, if nobody pays for it. Indeed, the cost of the term extension for consumers would be in the same order of magnitude (around Euro 1 billion).

Overall, it is clear that the proposed measures fail to reach each and all of their intended goals, hence the term extension, from 50 to 70 years, will harm Europe's culture and economy.

Objections and Critiques

(1) The term extension may be the only hope of a decent leaving for old performers.

Answer. As it has been already discussed, the proposal fails to provide for convincing mechanisms guaranteeing that any additional income will effectively accrue to the pockets of performers, since they lack bargaining power vis-à-vis the labels. This shortcoming can be solved only by mandatory provisions reserving a share of the overall proceeds deriving from a given performance to the benefit of performers themselves, e.g. by means of some form of ‘equitable remuneration’.

Moreover, the term extension may not offer a chance to redistribute from young to old artists (a characteristic that could be desirable in a system aiming at saving “retired” performers from poverty): instead, it may actually redistribute from the living to the dead artists, that is from actual creators to the estates of dead creators. In order to avoid that, at least, the term extension should be limited to the duration of performers' life.

(2) The Commission claims that consumer prices are not going to rise and that there is empirical evidence confirming this expectation.

Answer. There is indeed an empirical study that concluded that there was no systematic difference between prices of in-copyright and out-of copyright sound recordings.[11] However, the absence of a statistically significant difference between the prices of in-copyright and out-of copyright sound recordings in that study may be an effect of the limited set of available data. Moreover, this study, prepared for the British  Phonographic Industry, may hardly be seen as an independent analysis. In fact, a major analysis of the scope and nature of the public domain in Europe currently performed by Rightscom for the European Commission seem to confirm that richer datasets show clear evidence of the impact on prices of performer's rights [forthcoming: the study will be quoted in the final version of the recommendation].

(3)        Both under the new term and under the current term of protection, the majority of the recordings from the '60s would not really enter into the public domain, since their authors' copyright would still be in place. Hence, the expiration of related rights would impoverish performers, but one can expect little or no impact on prices for final users.

Answer. Indeed, under current rules, most copyright protected works would keep enjoying protection even though no term extension is granted. Typically the expiry of the current 50 years term for the protection of performers' and phonogram producers' right would bring into the public domain von Karajan’s performances of Beethoven, not Beatles' songs. The latter still enjoy copyright protection; most of the times classical music does not. This means that, if the current situation were to remain unchanged, the dissemination of a sizeable chunk of non-classical music by means of CD, DVDs or digital tracks as distributed through i-stores would in the near future require consent only from copyright holders (i.e. authors of music and lyrics; their heirs and assigns such as music publishers; collecting societies) to the exclusion of holders of performers’ and phonogram producers’ rights. This might lead to a benefit for the public, as economic theory predicts that the costs for end users tend to go up, when dissemination requires the authorisation of multiple categories of rightholders.

That the public would benefit from the confirmation of the current set of legal rules is not an unlikely proposition, if one considers that, in digital distribution, out of the typical 99 cents paid by end users to i-Tunes, 30 go to i-Tunes itself, 14 to authors and all the other 55 flow to labels. This means that the expiry of the final term of protection of neighbouring rights may entail a remarkable promise in specific connection with digital distribution.

(4)        We should take into account the effect of new technologies (in particular of the Internet) on the music industry: they are suffering from illegal peer-to-peer file sharing and the like and should be compensated!

Answer. Apart from the fact that it is hard to see how the extension of the term may in any way deter illegal distribution of music, the recording industry was quick enough to increase its legal prerogatives in connection with the legislative changes which accompanied the digital revolution. Phonogram producers, as such and as assignees of performers, successfully bargained for the legislative grant of a new exclusive right, the right of making available interactively performed and fixated works (Art. 3(2) of Directive 29/2001). This result was obtained at a time in which collecting societies  representing authors had reasons to question whether their mandate from rightholders also extended to this interactive feature. This was by itself a quite remarkable power shift to the advantage of the labels. This does not however mean that the power shift should also extend to the term of protection and that labels should thereby be put in a position to stake claims also for a time horizon in which, under current rules, all exclusive rights are due to concentrate in the hands of the authors and of their successors and assigns.

In reviewing this policy recommendations, the European Commission, the Parliament and the governments of member states of the European Union should

(i) consider that any change to the scope of copyright protection, including any expansion of exclusive rights or right to remuneration, needs to take into account, and possibly measure and quantify, the effects on the Public Domain; and

(ii) consider carefully the independent evidence against copyright term extension. The following independent studies commissioned by Member States, by the European Commission or undertaken by independent research centres recommended against any extension of the term of protection for sound recordings. The list includes statements and letters from European academics.

  1. Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: Included commissioned review of the Economic Evidence Relating to an Extension of the Term of Copyright in Sound Recordings (2006), Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law (CIPIL) – http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/gowers_review.htm
  2. P. Bernt Hugenholtz et al., The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy (November 2006) (report to the European Commission, DG Internal Market), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/ other/IViR_ Recast_Final_Report_2006.pdf;
  3. Professor David Newbery, FBA, University of Cambridge, letter to Commission President Barroso (April 10, 2008);
  4. Bournemouth Statement, letter and statement to Commission President Barroso (June 16, 2008), also published as Creativity stifled?, Eur. Intel. Prop. Rev. 341, 341-347 (September 2008), available at http://www.cippm.org.uk/copyright_term.html;
  5. Helberger, Duft, Van Gompel, Hugenholz, Never Forever: Why Extending the Term of  Protection of Sound Recordings is a Bad Idea, Eur. Intel. Prop Rev. 174 (2008);
  6. Hilty, Kur, Klass, Geiger, Peukert, Drexl, and Katzenberger, Stellungnahme des Max-Planck Instituts für Geistiges Eigentum, Wettbewerbs- und Steuerrecht zum Vorschlag der Kommission für eine Richtlinie zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2006/116 EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates Über die Schutzdauer des Urheberrechts und bestimmter verwandter Schutzrechte, GRUR Int. 907 (2008) [German version]; and Eur. Intel. Prop Rev. 59 (2009) [English version], available at http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/ stellungnahme-bmj-2008-09-10-def_eng.pdf (10 September 2008).
  7. Séverine Dusollier, Les artistes-interprètes pris en otage [Performers taken hostage], Centre de recherche informatique et droit (CRID), Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix de Namur, academic version: Auteurs & Media http://www.crid.be/pdf/public/5956.pdf;
  8. Stellungnahme zum Vorschlag der Kommission für eine Richtlinie zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2006/116/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über die Schutzdauer des Urheberrechts und bestimmter verwandter Schutzrechte, GRUR 38 (2009), available at http://www.grur.de/cms/upload/pdf/stellungnahmen/2008/2008-10-02_GRUR_Stn_RL_2006-116_EG.pdf;
  9. Kretschmer, Bently, Pollock, Hilty, Hugenholtz, Academic Joint Statement to MEPs, The Proposed Directive for a Copyright Term Extension – A backward-looking package (October 27, 2008), available at http://www.cippm.org.uk/copyright_term.html;
  10. Christophe Geiger, Jérôme Passa and Michel Vivant, La proposition de directive sur l’extension de la durée de certains droits voisins: une remise en cause injustifiée du domaine public [The Directive Proposal on Term Extension of Neighbouring Rights: an Unjustified Challenge of the Public Domain], extracts published in La Semaine Juridique, Edition Générale 2009, Libres propos, act. 46; Full academic version forthcoming in: Propriétés intellectuelles 2009 http://www.cepi.edu;
  11. Ricolfi, De Martin, Morando, Cogo, Sciacca, Cordero di Vonzo, and Musone, Presa di Posizione del Centro Nexa su Internet & Societa' del Politecnico di Torino sulla Proposta di Direttiva sull’Estensione dei Termini di Protezione dei Produttori di Fonogrammi e degli Artisti Interpreti ed Esecutori, available at  http://nexa.polito.it/direttivafonogrammi and http://nexa.polito.it/sites/nexa.polito.it/files/ProposedDirective Phonograms-NEXA-statement.pdf;
  12. Joint Press Release by European Academics - The Proposed Directive for a Copyright Term Extension (11 March 2009), available at http://www.cippm.org.uk/downloads/Press%20Release%20Copyright%20Extension.pdf.

Relevant Actions to be taken by:

  1. European Commission (EC)
  1. Withdraw the proposal to extend the term of protection for performers and sound recordings.
  2. Initiate a review process that examines the effectiveness of current terms of protection
  1. European Parliament (EP)
  2. Member States (MS)
  1. Withdraw the proposal to extend the term of protection for performers and sound recordings.

[11] Price Waterhouse Coopers, The Impact of Copyright Extension for Sound Recordings in the UK (April 28, 2006) (a report of the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property prepared on behalf of the British Phonographic Industry), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/report-termextension.pdf.

[The Policy Recommendations # 2 was initially delivered to the Commission on December 17, 2010 as deliverable DPolicy1 – First set of policy recommendations regarding the digital public domain.]

The Commission and Member States should carefully review expert opinions on this topic, as detailed at the end of this recommendation. Term extension will not create additional incentives to create but will make access to large parts of our audiovisual heritage more difficult than it already is. Instead of pursuing this special interest driven legislation the divergence in the length of protection between allotted to performers and authors should be taken as an opportunity to reevaluate the effectiveness of the current term of protection. Such a reevaluation must take into account the COMMUNIA policy recommendations #1 and #8.

Background

In July 2008, the European Commission adopted a proposal (COM(2008) 464/3) intended to extend the term of protection for performers and sound recordings. Currently these rights are protected for 50 years starting from the recording (or “fixation”) or from the performance, as the case may be. According to the proposal, the term would have been extended to 95 years. According to the Commission, the aim of the proposal was to bring performers' protection more in line with that currently available to authors (expiring 70 years after their death). More generally, the extended term was deemed necessary to enable performers to earn a decent income during their lifetime.

In April 2009 the proposal was voted in Parliament, which essentially approved it, with the following main planks: (1) the extension of the term of protection from 50 to 70 years (instead of the proposed 95); (2) the creation of a fund for the benefit of session players amounting to 20% of record labels' offline and online sales revenue coming from the term extension; (3) a “use it or lose it” clause allowing performers to get back control of their rights after 50 years, in cases in which producers are not marketing their recording; and (4) a newly introduced “clean slate” provision, preventing the use of previous contractual agreements to deduct money from the additional royalties granted to performers from the term extension.

Overall, the Parliament reduced the quantitative significance of the term extension (from 45 to 20 years) and slightly reinforced the provisions aimed at ensuring the benefits from the extension could accrue in a significant way to performers. However, these amendments did not substantially address the reasons because of which all the independent studies which examined the term extension proposal came to the conclusion that the proposed measures fail to reach each and all of their intended goals (see below).

That is the case because of several orders of reasons:

(1) The proposal fails to provide for additional income effectively accruing to the pockets of performers, since performers lack bargaining power vis-à-vis their more powerful counterparts, the labels (to which they frequently assign all their rights through so called buy-out agreements). Instead of addressing this issue, Art. 10a of the draft directive still provides that agreements between performers and phonogram producers entered into before the date of the term extension would remain in force, “in the absence of clear contractual  indications to the contrary”.

This conclusion is not affected by the provision whereby a minimum of 20% of the additional proceeds received by phonogram producers would be allocated to a collecting-society managed social fund. This benefit would accrue only to session musicians and, moreover, its calculation method is at best uncertain. The relevant proceeds are the ones generated through the reproduction, distribution and making available of the performances, with the exclusion of the important income deriving as a result of communication to the public (e.g. by radio broadcasting).

(2) The proposal does not even supply any effective incentive to phonogram producers and to labels. This is so for the very fundamental reason that the proposal also applies to existing works and no provision adopted today may provide any incentive towards investments which were already decided and made in the past. Even if we look at the future only, the need for an additional prospective incentive is hardly proved. Indeed, the common intuition whereby digital technology has decreased rather than increased the costs necessary to set up a performance and to fixate it has been confirmed by available empirical evidence [Helberger et al 2008].

(3) The Commission explicitly relates the need for a term extension to the fact that the music industry is suffering from illegal peer-to-peer file sharing and need to be compensated. However, it is hard to see how the extension of the term may in any way deter illegal distribution of music.

(4) The case made by the proposal whereby European label companies should be put on an equal footing with their US counterparts, which recently were granted an extension of terms similar to the one proposed for the EU, is technically flawed and misguided. Indeed, in the field of IP, including in connection with the neighbouring rights here considered, which in the US are described as copyright in sound recordings, the principle of National Treatment applies. Now, as a result of this principle, European labels currently are not in any way disadvantaged in comparison to their US counterparts. EU labels are treated in the US in the same way as their American competitors, which, in turn, are treated as European labels in the EU. Quite apart from this, all the “majors” are US labels; therefore any term extension would disproportionately benefit US firms to the detriment of EU consumers.

(5) In specific connection with the issue of the assessment of the costs the legislative measure would involve, the argument advanced by the Commission whereby the term extension would not entail additional costs, as a survey has shown that the price of in copyright music does not exceed the cost of music out of copyright, is disingenuous and self-contradictory. In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission mentions that the term extension would generate additional income for phonogram producers in the range of over Euro 750 million. Now, it would appear that it is impossible that additional income accrues to one group of beneficiaries, if nobody pays for it. Indeed, the cost of the term extension for consumers would be in the same order of magnitude (around Euro 1 billion).

Overall, it is clear that the proposed measures fail to reach each and all of their intended goals, hence the term extension, from 50 to 70 years, will harm Europe's culture and economy.

Objections and Critiques

(1) The term extension may be the only hope of a decent leaving for old performers.

Answer. As it has been already discussed, the proposal fails to provide for convincing mechanisms guaranteeing that any additional income will effectively accrue to the pockets of performers, since they lack bargaining power vis-à-vis the labels. This shortcoming can be solved only by mandatory provisions reserving a share of the overall proceeds deriving from a given performance to the benefit of performers themselves, e.g. by means of some form of ‘equitable remuneration’.

Moreover, the term extension may not offer a chance to redistribute from young to old artists (a characteristic that could be desirable in a system aiming at saving “retired” performers from poverty): instead, it may actually redistribute from the living to the dead artists, that is from actual creators to the estates of dead creators. In order to avoid that, at least, the term extension should be limited to the duration of performers' life.

(2) The Commission claims that consumer prices are not going to rise and that there is empirical evidence confirming this expectation.

Answer. There is indeed an empirical study that concluded that there was no systematic difference between prices of in-copyright and out-of copyright sound recordings.[11] However, the absence of a statistically significant difference between the prices of in-copyright and out-of copyright sound recordings in that study may be an effect of the limited set of available data. Moreover, this study, prepared for the British  Phonographic Industry, may hardly be seen as an independent analysis. In fact, a major analysis of the scope and nature of the public domain in Europe currently performed by Rightscom for the European Commission seem to confirm that richer datasets show clear evidence of the impact on prices of performer's rights [forthcoming: the study will be quoted in the final version of the recommendation].

(3)        Both under the new term and under the current term of protection, the majority of the recordings from the '60s would not really enter into the public domain, since their authors' copyright would still be in place. Hence, the expiration of related rights would impoverish performers, but one can expect little or no impact on prices for final users.

Answer. Indeed, under current rules, most copyright protected works would keep enjoying protection even though no term extension is granted. Typically the expiry of the current 50 years term for the protection of performers' and phonogram producers' right would bring into the public domain von Karajan’s performances of Beethoven, not Beatles' songs. The latter still enjoy copyright protection; most of the times classical music does not. This means that, if the current situation were to remain unchanged, the dissemination of a sizeable chunk of non-classical music by means of CD, DVDs or digital tracks as distributed through i-stores would in the near future require consent only from copyright holders (i.e. authors of music and lyrics; their heirs and assigns such as music publishers; collecting societies) to the exclusion of holders of performers’ and phonogram producers’ rights. This might lead to a benefit for the public, as economic theory predicts that the costs for end users tend to go up, when dissemination requires the authorisation of multiple categories of rightholders.

That the public would benefit from the confirmation of the current set of legal rules is not an unlikely proposition, if one considers that, in digital distribution, out of the typical 99 cents paid by end users to i-Tunes, 30 go to i-Tunes itself, 14 to authors and all the other 55 flow to labels. This means that the expiry of the final term of protection of neighbouring rights may entail a remarkable promise in specific connection with digital distribution.

(4)        We should take into account the effect of new technologies (in particular of the Internet) on the music industry: they are suffering from illegal peer-to-peer file sharing and the like and should be compensated!

Answer. Apart from the fact that it is hard to see how the extension of the term may in any way deter illegal distribution of music, the recording industry was quick enough to increase its legal prerogatives in connection with the legislative changes which accompanied the digital revolution. Phonogram producers, as such and as assignees of performers, successfully bargained for the legislative grant of a new exclusive right, the right of making available interactively performed and fixated works (Art. 3(2) of Directive 29/2001). This result was obtained at a time in which collecting societies  representing authors had reasons to question whether their mandate from rightholders also extended to this interactive feature. This was by itself a quite remarkable power shift to the advantage of the labels. This does not however mean that the power shift should also extend to the term of protection and that labels should thereby be put in a position to stake claims also for a time horizon in which, under current rules, all exclusive rights are due to concentrate in the hands of the authors and of their successors and assigns.

In reviewing this policy recommendations, the European Commission, the Parliament and the governments of member states of the European Union should

(i) consider that any change to the scope of copyright protection, including any expansion of exclusive rights or right to remuneration, needs to take into account, and possibly measure and quantify, the effects on the Public Domain; and

(ii) consider carefully the independent evidence against copyright term extension. The following independent studies commissioned by Member States, by the European Commission or undertaken by independent research centres recommended against any extension of the term of protection for sound recordings. The list includes statements and letters from European academics.

  1. Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: Included commissioned review of the Economic Evidence Relating to an Extension of the Term of Copyright in Sound Recordings (2006), Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law (CIPIL) – http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/gowers_review.htm
  2. P. Bernt Hugenholtz et al., The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy (November 2006) (report to the European Commission, DG Internal Market), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/ other/IViR_ Recast_Final_Report_2006.pdf;
  3. Professor David Newbery, FBA, University of Cambridge, letter to Commission President Barroso (April 10, 2008);
  4. Bournemouth Statement, letter and statement to Commission President Barroso (June 16, 2008), also published as Creativity stifled?, Eur. Intel. Prop. Rev. 341, 341-347 (September 2008), available at http://www.cippm.org.uk/copyright_term.html;
  5. Helberger, Duft, Van Gompel, Hugenholz, Never Forever: Why Extending the Term of  Protection of Sound Recordings is a Bad Idea, Eur. Intel. Prop Rev. 174 (2008);
  6. Hilty, Kur, Klass, Geiger, Peukert, Drexl, and Katzenberger, Stellungnahme des Max-Planck Instituts für Geistiges Eigentum, Wettbewerbs- und Steuerrecht zum Vorschlag der Kommission für eine Richtlinie zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2006/116 EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates Über die Schutzdauer des Urheberrechts und bestimmter verwandter Schutzrechte, GRUR Int. 907 (2008) [German version]; and Eur. Intel. Prop Rev. 59 (2009) [English version], available at http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/ stellungnahme-bmj-2008-09-10-def_eng.pdf (10 September 2008).
  7. Séverine Dusollier, Les artistes-interprètes pris en otage [Performers taken hostage], Centre de recherche informatique et droit (CRID), Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix de Namur, academic version: Auteurs & Media http://www.crid.be/pdf/public/5956.pdf;
  8. Stellungnahme zum Vorschlag der Kommission für eine Richtlinie zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2006/116/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über die Schutzdauer des Urheberrechts und bestimmter verwandter Schutzrechte, GRUR 38 (2009), available at http://www.grur.de/cms/upload/pdf/stellungnahmen/2008/2008-10-02_GRUR_Stn_RL_2006-116_EG.pdf;
  9. Kretschmer, Bently, Pollock, Hilty, Hugenholtz, Academic Joint Statement to MEPs, The Proposed Directive for a Copyright Term Extension – A backward-looking package (October 27, 2008), available at http://www.cippm.org.uk/copyright_term.html;
  10. Christophe Geiger, Jérôme Passa and Michel Vivant, La proposition de directive sur l’extension de la durée de certains droits voisins: une remise en cause injustifiée du domaine public [The Directive Proposal on Term Extension of Neighbouring Rights: an Unjustified Challenge of the Public Domain], extracts published in La Semaine Juridique, Edition Générale 2009, Libres propos, act. 46; Full academic version forthcoming in: Propriétés intellectuelles 2009 http://www.cepi.edu;
  11. Ricolfi, De Martin, Morando, Cogo, Sciacca, Cordero di Vonzo, and Musone, Presa di Posizione del Centro Nexa su Internet & Societa' del Politecnico di Torino sulla Proposta di Direttiva sull’Estensione dei Termini di Protezione dei Produttori di Fonogrammi e degli Artisti Interpreti ed Esecutori, available at  http://nexa.polito.it/direttivafonogrammi and http://nexa.polito.it/sites/nexa.polito.it/files/ProposedDirective Phonograms-NEXA-statement.pdf;
  12. Joint Press Release by European Academics - The Proposed Directive for a Copyright Term Extension (11 March 2009), available at http://www.cippm.org.uk/downloads/Press%20Release%20Copyright%20Extension.pdf.

Relevant Actions to be taken by:

  1. European Commission (EC)
  1. Withdraw the proposal to extend the term of protection for performers and sound recordings.
  2. Initiate a review process that examines the effectiveness of current terms of protection
  1. European Parliament (EP)
  2. Member States (MS)
  1. Withdraw the proposal to extend the term of protection for performers and sound recordings.

[11] Price Waterhouse Coopers, The Impact of Copyright Extension for Sound Recordings in the UK (April 28, 2006) (a report of the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property prepared on behalf of the British Phonographic Industry), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/report-termextension.pdf.